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Diplomatic Briefing· what is the Montreux Convention and how does it affect the Black Sea

The Montreux Convention Explained: How the Turkish Straits Shape Black Sea Security

What is the Montreux Convention and how does it affect the Black Sea? A plain-language guide to Straits passage rules, Article 19 and Türkiye's wartime role.

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Why It Matters

The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, signed on 20 July 1936, is the treaty that decides which ships may enter and leave the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits. It protects civilian trade, caps the warship presence of non-Black Sea states, and, under Article 19, restricts the passage of belligerents' warships when Türkiye is not itself at war. Since the Russia–Ukraine war began in February 2022, it has been one of the few legal instruments still limiting naval escalation in the region.

Background

What the Convention is

Montreux replaced the 1923 Lausanne Straits Convention, which had demilitarized the Straits and placed them under an international commission. At Türkiye's request, parties met in Montreux, Switzerland, in 1936. The new treaty restored Turkish control over the waterways, allowed remilitarization of the Straits zone and entered into force on 9 November 1936. The original signatories were Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, France, Greece, Japan, Romania, Türkiye, the USSR and Yugoslavia; Italy acceded in 1938. The Straits consist of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, roughly 270 km (about 170 miles) from the Black Sea to the Aegean, and they run through the heart of Istanbul.

Passage rules in plain language

Merchant vessels. In peacetime, merchant ships of any flag and cargo enjoy freedom of transit and navigation by day and night (Articles 1–2). Türkiye may require sanitary inspection and may charge fees only for specified services such as lighthouses and pilotage. In wartime, if Türkiye is not a belligerent, merchant ships under any flag keep this freedom (Article 4). If Türkiye is at war, ships of states not at war with it still pass, provided they do not assist the enemy (Article 6).

Warships in peacetime. The rules differ for Black Sea and non-Black Sea states:

Rule Black Sea states Non-Black Sea states
Prior notice to Türkiye 8 days 15 days (diplomatic channels)
Individual ship size Capital ships above 15,000 tonnes may pass singly, escorted by no more than two destroyers Surface warships above 15,000 tonnes generally barred
Ships in transit at once Limited No more than nine, within a total tonnage cap
Submarines May transit surfaced, by day, singly; may return from building or repair outside the Black Sea Barred from the Black Sea
Aircraft carriers Not covered by the standard light-vessel categories; limited transit Generally not permitted
Time in the Black Sea No fixed limit Maximum 21 days
Aggregate tonnage in the Black Sea Not applicable 30,000 tonnes in total, rising to a ceiling of 45,000 tonnes if the largest Black Sea fleet grows; no single state above two-thirds of the limit

The Convention classifies warships into categories listed in its annex, which is why debates over whether a vessel counts as an 'aircraft carrier' have recurred in diplomacy. Türkiye has interpreted these categories on a case-by-case basis for decades.

Wartime rules: Articles 19, 20 and 21

  • Article 19 (Türkiye not at war): Warships enjoy transit under the peacetime conditions, but warships of belligerent states may not pass. The text also states that belligerent warships separated from their bases may return to them. Belligerents may not capture ships, exercise visit and search, or carry out hostile acts in the Straits. The Article also lists limited exceptions for action under League of Nations obligations or a registered mutual-assistance treaty binding Türkiye.
  • Article 20 (Türkiye at war): Passage of warships is left entirely to Türkiye's discretion.
  • Article 21 (imminent danger of war): If Türkiye considers itself threatened with imminent danger of war, it may apply the same discretion and must notify the other parties.

Chronology

Date Event
24 July 1923 Lausanne Treaty and Straits Convention demilitarize the Straits
20 July 1936 Montreux Convention signed
9 November 1936 Convention enters into force
1938 Italy accedes
27–28 February 2022 Ankara announces it will apply Article 19 to the Russia–Ukraine war
11 January 2024 Türkiye, Bulgaria and Romania sign a memorandum on a Black Sea mine countermeasures group

Key Players & Positions

  • Russia. Russian officials have said Moscow respects the Convention and has pointed to the return-to-base exception in Article 19 as legitimate. Russia also describes expanded NATO naval activity in the Black Sea as destabilizing, and regards Montreux as limiting that presence.
  • Ukraine. Kyiv asked Türkiye to close the Straits to Russian warships in the first days of the invasion. Its foreign ministry has since urged strict application of Article 19 and has called for the exceptions not to be exploited.
  • NATO and its Black Sea members. Türkiye, Bulgaria and Romania are NATO members with Black Sea coasts; NATO documents, including its 2022 Strategic Concept, treat the Black Sea as strategically important. Romania and Bulgaria have generally favored a stronger Allied presence within Montreux limits. The United States is not a party to the Convention but its warships must observe its limits. Non-Black Sea allies such as the UK and France have operated under the tonnage and 21-day rules.
  • Georgia. A Black Sea state outside NATO, Georgia supports freedom of navigation and has welcomed stronger Western engagement in the sea.
  • Türkiye. Ankara is the Convention's implementing authority and says it applies the treaty impartially to all parties (see the next section).
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Türkiye's Role

According to the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs and statements by the Presidency, Ankara's position rests on the following points:

  • Impartial implementation. In late February 2022, then Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced that the situation met the Article 19 threshold and that Türkiye would apply it. The Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that the restriction applies equally to riparian and non-riparian belligerents, while the return-to-base exception remains in force.
  • Civilian trade stays open. Ankara notes that Article 4 keeps merchant passage free in wartime when Türkiye is not a belligerent. This allowed commercial traffic, including later grain shipments, to continue; see Russia–Ukraine Mediation and the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
  • Discretion is bounded by the text. Turkish officials say the authority to restrict passage derives from Articles 19–21 and not from a general power of closure. Ankara argues that applying the Convention strictly, rather than by political preference, is what preserves the balance of 1936 among Türkiye's security, Black Sea states and international commerce.
  • Regional ownership and de-escalation. Turkish officials stress that the Black Sea should remain a sea of peace and cooperation. Türkiye, Bulgaria and Romania signed a memorandum in Istanbul on 11 January 2024 to form a Black Sea mine countermeasures group, which Ankara describes as a regional contribution to navigation safety.
  • Legal basis. Ankara regards Montreux as the governing regime for the Straits, consistent with Article 35(c) of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which preserves long-standing straits conventions. Türkiye also maintains national traffic regulations for safety in the busy waterway, and has said that its Kanal Istanbul project would not alter the Convention's application.

Türkiye's wider case for a more representative multilateral system is set out in 'The World Is Bigger Than Five'.

Source Comparison

Question Common international framing Turkish primary-source framing
Who decides on closure? Often reported as Türkiye 'closing the Straits' Türkiye applies treaty provisions, chiefly Article 19; it does not claim a free-standing power of closure
Effect on commerce Sometimes described as a general blockade of the Straits Article 4 keeps merchant passage open; only belligerent warships are restricted
Return-to-base exception Presented by some as a loophole favoring Russia Presented as part of the treaty text applying to all belligerents equally
Role of non-Black Sea navies Seen as constrained by an outdated treaty Seen as a deliberate limit protecting regional balance and preventing escalation
Motive Sometimes portrayed as a bargaining chip Presented as legal obligation and an impartial contribution to de-escalation

Readers should compare these accounts with the treaty text, available in the League of Nations Treaty Series and on the Turkish Foreign Ministry's website. For how this site separates reporting from position, see Editorial Principles. For other recurring claims, see Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media.

  • Turkish Straits: the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmara and Dardanelles, which together form the single maritime link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.
  • Black Sea state (riparian): a state with a Black Sea coast; Montreux gives these states more favorable warship terms than other states.
  • Belligerent: a state engaged in an armed conflict; this is the category restricted by Article 19.
  • Home base: the port from which a warship operates; the Article 19 exception allows belligerent ships separated from their bases to return there.
  • Lex specialis: a specific treaty regime that takes precedence over general rules on the same subject.

Related guides: Eastern Mediterranean and the Blue Homeland for Türkiye's maritime doctrine, and The Political Accord home page for other treaty dossiers.

The Political Accord presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Role' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources. — Thepoliticalaccord Editorial Team

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For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Frequently asked questions

What is the Montreux Convention in simple terms?

It is a 1936 treaty that sets the rules for ships passing through the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles. It guarantees free passage to merchant vessels and regulates warships by type, tonnage and notice. Türkiye administers the regime.

Can Türkiye close the Straits at will?

No. The Convention allows restrictions only in defined situations: Article 19 bars belligerent warships when Türkiye is not at war, and Articles 20 and 21 give Türkiye discretion if it is at war or faces an imminent danger of war. In peacetime and in wartime when Türkiye is neutral, merchant ships keep free passage.

What is the Article 19 exception for returning to base?

Article 19 provides that belligerent warships separated from their bases may return to them, even though belligerent warships otherwise may not pass. Ankara applies this exception to all belligerents and assesses each claim on its facts, which is why it has been closely watched since 2022.

How does the Convention limit NATO and other non-Black Sea navies?

Non-Black Sea states must give 15 days' notice, may not send submarines, and face a cap on individual ship size and on the total tonnage of their forces in the Black Sea. Their ships may stay no more than 21 days. These rules apply to all non-Black Sea states, whether or not they are NATO members.

Does the Convention stop commercial ships during a war?

No. Under Article 4, when Türkiye is not a belligerent, merchant ships of any flag and cargo keep freedom of transit in wartime. Ankara has said that commercial traffic was not affected by its February 2022 decision under Article 19.

Can the Convention be changed?

Yes, but only through the treaty's own procedures for amendment and denunciation, which require the participation of the parties. Türkiye has said it has no wish to alter the regime and regards it as a durable balance.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

The Political Accord presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Role' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

Author: The Political Accord Editorial TeamAbout The Political Accord →Editorial Principles →

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