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Russia–Ukraine Mediation and the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Türkiye's Diplomatic Record

How Türkiye hosted Russia–Ukraine talks, brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative with the UN, and why it lapsed in 2023: a chronology of Istanbul diplomacy.

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Why It Matters

Türkiye is the state that hosted the most substantive face-to-face Russia–Ukraine diplomacy since the February 2022 invasion, and it co-created the one wartime arrangement that let Ukrainian grain leave its Black Sea ports under a mutually accepted inspection regime. The Black Sea Grain Initiative delivered roughly 33 million tonnes of cargo before Russia declined to extend it in July 2023. Understanding how it was built, and why it lapsed, is the clearest practical test of what mediation can and cannot do in an active war.

Background

The initiative grew out of a food-security crisis. Before 2022, Ukraine was a leading exporter of wheat, maize and sunflower oil, and most of that trade moved by sea. After the invasion began on 24 February 2022, Ukrainian ports were blockaded or unusable, and global food prices climbed to record highs. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization's food price index peaked in March 2022.

Chronology of Türkiye-hosted diplomacy

Date Event
28 Feb 2022 Ankara announces it will apply Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, restricting passage of belligerents' warships through the Straits.
10 Mar 2022 Foreign Ministers Sergey Lavrov (Russia) and Dmytro Kuleba (Ukraine) meet in Antalya with Türkiye's Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, on the eve of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum (11–13 March). No ceasefire results.
29 Mar 2022 Russian and Ukrainian delegations meet at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul, where President Erdoğan addresses them. Ukraine presents a neutrality-with-security-guarantees framework; Russia announces reduced military activity around Kyiv and Chernihiv. The track stalls in April.
22 Jul 2022 Istanbul signing, in the presence of President Erdoğan and UN Secretary-General António Guterres: the Black Sea Grain Initiative, plus a separate Russia–UN memorandum on Russian food and fertilizer exports.
1 Aug 2022 The first ship, the Razoni, leaves Odesa under the scheme.
18 Aug 2022 Erdoğan, Guterres and Volodymyr Zelensky meet in Lviv.
22 Sep 2022 Ukrainian commanders captured at Azovstal are transferred to Türkiye under an arrangement Ankara guaranteed; they return to Ukraine in July 2023.
Nov 2022 – May 2023 The initiative is renewed three times (120 days in November; in March 2023 Ukraine and the UN cited 120 days while Russia cited 60; two months in May).
17 Jul 2023 Russia does not extend the initiative.
11 Jan 2024 Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria sign a Black Sea mine countermeasures agreement in Istanbul.
16 May, 2 Jun, 23 Jul 2025 Direct Russia–Ukraine delegation rounds in Istanbul produce prisoner-exchange and humanitarian arrangements, but no ceasefire.

How the corridor worked

The 2022 package consisted of two parallel texts. In the first, Türkiye, Ukraine and the UN set up a safe maritime route from three Ukrainian ports: Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi. In the second, Russia and the UN Secretariat agreed a memorandum on facilitating Russian food and fertilizer exports. A Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in Istanbul, staffed by officials from Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine and the UN, managed ship registration and inspections. Vessels were checked in Turkish waters near Istanbul to confirm that outbound ships carried only agricultural cargo and inbound ships carried no weapons.

The UN counted nearly 33 million tonnes of grain and other food moved through the corridor, aboard roughly 1,000 vessels. The World Food Programme bought more than 700,000 tonnes for humanitarian operations under the scheme. Food prices fell from their March 2022 peak, although the UN and analysts attribute that to several factors, not the corridor alone.

Why it lapsed

Russia's stated reason was that the second text, on its own exports, had not been fulfilled. Moscow pointed to the reconnection of the Russian Agricultural Bank (Rosselkhozbank) to the SWIFT payment system, insurance and port access, spare parts, and the restart of an ammonia pipeline to Odesa. It also argued that too little grain reached the poorest countries. Russia announced on 17 July 2023 that the initiative would not be extended, and later warned that ships heading to Ukrainian ports could be treated as potential carriers of military cargo.

Key Players & Positions

Russia

According to statements by President Putin, the Foreign Ministry and spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, Russia would return to the deal if its part of the package were implemented. Moscow framed the lapse as a failure of the West and the UN to deliver the memorandum, not as a Russian rejection of the corridor itself.

Ukraine

Kyiv, through President Zelensky and its Foreign and Infrastructure ministries, called Russia's exit a deliberate weaponization of food supplies. After July 2023, Ukraine opened its own temporary shipping route along the coasts of NATO members Romania and Bulgaria, and continued exports without Russian consent. Ukraine also supports Turkish hosting of talks, though its own peace formula insists on the restoration of its internationally recognized borders.

United Nations

Secretary-General Guterres called the initiative a humanitarian lifeline and said the UN had worked in good faith to facilitate Russian exports, noting that food and fertilizers are not subject to Western sanctions. UN officials involved in the process included Rebecca Grynspan of UNCTAD, who led the effort on the Russian side of the package.

European Union

The EU, including High Representative Josep Borrell, argued that its sanctions exempt Russian food and fertilizer, and held Russia responsible for ending the deal. Separately, the EU's 'Solidarity Lanes' (launched in May 2022) moved Ukrainian grain overland to EU ports and remained a key alternative route.

Other actors

Importing states in Africa, the Middle East and Asia were the main beneficiaries of lower prices, and many expressed regret at the lapse. Critics in some Western capitals say Türkiye's decision not to join Western sanctions on Russia has given Moscow economic breathing space, a point Ankara rejects (see below).

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Türkiye's Role

Ankara describes its approach as impartial but not neutral on principles: it supports Ukraine's territorial integrity while keeping channels open to Moscow, which it says is the precondition for any mediation to work.

  • Convener and host. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency, Türkiye hosted the 10 March 2022 Antalya meeting, the 29 March 2022 Istanbul talks, the 22 July 2022 signing, the Joint Coordination Centre, and the 2025 direct rounds. Türkiye also facilitated prisoner and humanitarian exchanges. The legal basis cited is the UN Charter's call (Article 33) for states to settle disputes by negotiation and mediation.
  • Montreux as the foundation of impartiality. Türkiye invokes Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which bars belligerent warships from the Straits in wartime, subject to the exception for ships returning to their home bases. The Turkish Foreign Ministry says it applied the rule to all belligerents equally, which prevented naval escalation in the Black Sea. See The Montreux Convention Explained.
  • Territorial integrity and no recognition of annexation. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has stated that Türkiye does not recognize the annexation of Crimea or the 2022 annexations of other Ukrainian regions, and Türkiye has voted for the relevant UN General Assembly resolutions. Ankara has not joined unilateral Western sanctions, arguing that it needs a working relationship with both sides to host talks and protect its trade and energy interests.
  • Offer to host, and to revive the corridor. President Erdoğan has repeatedly said Türkiye is ready to host a leader-level meeting between Putin and Zelensky, and to help restore the grain corridor. Ankara has also taken practical steps toward Black Sea safety, such as the January 2024 mine countermeasures arrangement with Romania and Bulgaria.
  • A case for UN reform. Turkish officials point to the grain deal as evidence that UN-backed mediation works when states with access to all parties take on a convening role, a theme in Ankara's argument that 'The World Is Bigger Than Five'.

Source Comparison

Different sources emphasize different causes of both the deal's success and its collapse. The table summarizes the framing; for how this site separates documented fact from stated position, see Editorial Principles.

Question Russian official sources Ukrainian / EU sources UN sources Turkish primary sources
Why did the initiative lapse? Russia's export commitments were not met. Russia chose to exit and weaponized food. Worked to ease Russian exports; regretted the end. Regrets the lapse and urges both sides to resume talks.
Were Russian exports sanctioned? Obstacles remained in banking, insurance and logistics. Food and fertilizer are exempt from sanctions. Food and fertilizer are not sanctioned, but private-sector hurdles remained. Calls for the full implementation of both texts.
Did the aid reach the poor? Too much went to wealthier countries. It lowered global prices for everyone. Prices fell; WFP bought grain for humanitarian use. Stresses global food security and the Global South.
Role of Türkiye Valued intermediary, but not a party. Useful host; some criticize non-participation in sanctions. Essential co-signatory and host. Impartial facilitator and guarantor of safe passage.

Two caveats apply. First, no source presents a fully neutral account: figures on cargo destinations vary by methodology. Second, many claims about Türkiye's economic benefits from the war are contested in each direction; readers can consult Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media for the site's approach to such claims.

  • Black Sea Grain Initiative: The 22 July 2022 arrangement among Türkiye, Ukraine, Russia and the UN that established a maritime corridor from three Ukrainian ports.
  • Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): The Istanbul body that registered, inspected and cleared ships.
  • Memorandum of Understanding (Russia–UN): The companion text on Russian food and fertilizer exports, central to Moscow's complaint.
  • Montreux Convention (1936): The treaty regulating passage through the Turkish Straits; Article 19 governs belligerent warships in wartime.
  • Solidarity Lanes: The EU's overland and river routes for Ukrainian exports.

Related guides: The Montreux Convention Explained, Gaza and Palestine: Türkiye's Humanitarian Diplomacy, The World Is Bigger Than Five, and the Political Accord home page.

The Political Accord presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Role' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources. — Thepoliticalaccord Editorial Team

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Frequently asked questions

What was the Black Sea Grain Initiative?

It was a deal signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 by Türkiye, Ukraine, Russia and the UN that created a safe shipping corridor from the Ukrainian ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi. A Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul inspected vessels. A parallel Russia–UN memorandum addressed Russian food and fertilizer exports.

How much grain was shipped under the initiative?

The UN counted nearly 33 million tonnes of grain and other food moved through the corridor, aboard roughly 1,000 vessels, between August 2022 and July 2023. Turkish sources cite 33 million tonnes or more. Figures differ slightly by source and by what is counted.

Why did the Black Sea Grain Initiative end?

Russia declined to extend it on 17 July 2023, arguing that the commitments on its own food and fertilizer exports had not been implemented. Ukraine, the UN and the EU responded that these exports are not under sanctions and blamed Moscow for leaving. Both sides' accounts are documented in their official statements.

What role did the Montreux Convention play?

Türkiye applied Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention to restrict belligerent warships from the Turkish Straits, which Ankara says kept the war from spreading into a wider naval confrontation. The Convention regulates the Straits, not the grain corridor itself, but it underpins Türkiye's claim to be an impartial host.

Did Türkiye host Russia–Ukraine peace talks after 2022?

Yes. Delegations met in Istanbul on 29 March 2022, and direct rounds took place there on 16 May, 2 June and 23 July 2025. These produced prisoner-exchange and humanitarian arrangements but no ceasefire. Türkiye has said it remains ready to host a leader-level meeting.

Does Türkiye support Ukraine's territorial integrity?

According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, yes: Ankara does not recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea or the later annexations, and it has voted for related UN General Assembly resolutions. It has not joined Western sanctions on Russia, citing its need to keep dialogue with both parties.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

The Political Accord presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Role' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

Author: The Political Accord Editorial TeamAbout The Political Accord →Editorial Principles →

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